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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.20030848-CA

JAMES J. QUINN,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs (DUI), a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (2001); keeping an
open container in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20
(2001); and driving without a license for the class of motor vehicle, a class C
misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-207 (2001), in the First Judicial District,
Cache County, the Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Did the trial court properly sentence defendant for third-degree felony DUI with
prior convictions where the court, acting as trier-of-fact, had explicitly found every
element of the crime and had conveyed, if not formally announced, its verdict?
No standard of review applies.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one third degree felony—driving under the influence
of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI) within ten years of two or more prior convictions. Rl-2.
He was also charged with three class C misdemeanors—carrying an open container in his
vehicle, driving a class of motor vehicle without being licensed in that class, and driving
with defective equipment. Id. Defendant moved to dismiss the felony DUI charge,
arguing that ex post facto and due process protections prohibited any enhancement of his
conviction on the basis of his prior convictions. R33, 37-43. The parties filed
memoranda on the motion. R37-43, 46-58. Following argument on the matter, the trial
court denied the motion. R65-66, 69-72; MT.1
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial. R77, 79. On September 6, 2002, the
trial court conducted a bench trial. R81-82, TT. The court found defendant guilty of the
DUI. TT66. The court also found that the State had produced evidence of two
convictions within the ten-year period preceding the DUI offense. Id.; see also R56-58,
81-83 One of the convictions, entered March 12, 1993, followed a trial. TT63; see also
R58. The other, entered October 12, 1993, was based on a guilty plea. TT63; see also
R56-57.
At the close of trial, defendant claimed that the State had the burden to show not
only the fact of the previous convictions, but also that the guilty plea, upon which the

The transcripts in this case have not been assigned record numbers. The State
therefore refers to the transcripts of the proceedings as MT (hearing on motion to
dismiss), TT (trial), and ST (sentencing hearing).
2

October 1993 conviction was predicated, had been voluntarily entered. TT67-68. The
Court found defendant "guilty of at least the lesser included offense of DUI," but
reserved disposition of the third degree felony enhancement issue until the parties could
brief defendant's burden of proof claim. TT67-68. The trial court set a hearing on the
matter and sentencing for November 26, 2002. R.104. Defendant did not appear. R105.
Defendant was apprehended on a bench warrant and appeared at a hearing on
September 4, 2003, almost one year later. R109-110. The court reset sentencing for
September 15, 2003. R109. The trial court opened the sentencing hearing by stating, "I
understand we have a third degree felony, driving under the influence. Driving with the
wrong class of license and an open container. Any reason sentence should not be passed
at this time?" ST2. Defense counsel responded, "No, Your Honor." Id.
The court then asked defense counsel, "Anything you or your client would like to
say?" Id. Defense counsel responded, "Just that I've had the opportunity to review the
presentence report with defendant in this particular matter. We would note to the court
that the two prior DUI offenses occurred approximately nine-and-a-half years ago. This
is a third DUI that did occur within the ten year statutory period." Id.
The court asked defendant if he would like to say anything. Id. Defendant said
that he was sorry and took full responsibility for his actions. Id.
The court sentenced defendant to serve a prison term of no more than five years on
the DUI charge and ordered concurrent ten-day jail sentences on the wrong class of
license and open container charges. Id. at 3.
Defendant timely appealed. Rl 17.
3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Shortly after midnight on August 8, 2001, Sergeant Brett Randall of the Logan
City Police Department saw defendant driving a blue car with the headlights off. TT3, 5.
He also observed the passenger taking drinks from what appeared to be a beer can. Id. at
4. He turned on his overhead lights and pulled the car over. Id. at 4-5.
As he approached the car, he noticed that the driver was wearing only his boxer
shorts. M a t 5. A heavy odor of alcohol emanated from the vehicle. Id. The driver's
speech was slow and slurred. Id. His eyes were bloodshot. Id. at 6. Officer Randall
asked defendant to step out of his car. Id. at 8. He noticed that defendant swayed when
he walked and had difficulty keeping his balance. Id.
Officer Randall asked defendant whether he had been drinking, and defendant said
that he had drunk "two or three." Id. at 9. The officer assumed that defendant was
referring to two or three beers. Id. The officer then informed defendant that he was
going to give him some tests to determine whether or not it would be safe for him to drive
home. Id. The officer performed various field sobriety tests, and defendant was unable
to perform the required tasks. Id. at 9-17.
The officer then administered a breathalyzer test. Id. at 17. The portable breath
machine registered positive for the presence of alcohol in defendant's breath, but because
defendant could not or would not blow a breath of sufficient length, the officer could not
get a proper alcohol level reading. Id. at 18. Based on his experience and observations,
however, the officer determined that defendant was "[ejxtremely intoxicated"—
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"intoxicated to the point that he couldn't safely operate a motor vehicle/5 and arrested
him. Id. at 19.
Upon searching defendant's car, the officer found an open container of alcohol
wedged between a seat occupied by defendant's passenger and the passenger-side door.
Id. at 20. The officer later ran a check on defendant's driver's license and found that it
had expired. Id. at 23.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly imposed a sentence for third degree felony DUI with prior
convictions. While the court did not formally announce its verdict, its uncontroverted
informal statement, "I understand we are here on a third degree felony, driving under the
influence," conveyed its verdict. All parties knew that the trial court had found every
element of the felony DUI and only withheld a formal announcement of verdict to allow
defendant to argue that the prior convictions could not be used to enhance his conviction.
Defendant had abandoned his efforts to make that argument prior to sentencing, the
argument was contrary to controlling law, and defendant does not reassert it on appeal.
As to his claim regarding announcement of the verdict, if any error occurred,
defendant invited it when, prior to sentencing, he affirmatively represented to the trial
court that there was no reason that sentence should not be passed on defendant's third
degree felony conviction. Moreover, if defendant has any remedy, it is not vacation of
his felony sentence and imposition of a misdemeanor sentence. At most, he is entitled to
have the trial court formally enter a guilty verdict on the felony DUI charge and then
sentence him again to the term it originally imposed.
5

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED A SENTENCE FOR
THIRD DEGREE FELONY DUI WITH PRIOR CONVICTIONS;
THE TRIAL COURT'S INFORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS
VERDICT SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION
Defendant claims that his "sentence for [the felony] DUI was patently illegal in
that [the trial court] sentenced him to a sentence consistent to that of a 3 rd degree felony
when defendant^ was only found guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Br. Appellant at 7.
In making his claim, defendant suggests that he was acquitted of the felony charge. He
was not. The record makes clear that the trial court and both parties understood that
defendant was guilty of a felony. The only issue for this Court is whether the trial court's
informal pre-sentencing announcement of defendant's guilt sufficed to support his
conviction or whether the case must be remanded for formal announcement of the
verdict.2
A.

If any error occurred, it was only that the trial court did not more formally
announce the verdict. Defendant invited that error, and this Court should
therefore reject his claim.
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly sentenced him on a third degree

felony because it "failed to rule on the enhancement from a class B misdemeanor to a 3
degree felony." Br. Appellant at 7. If the trial court erred, defendant invited the error by
affirmatively representing that there was no reason that sentence should not be
pronounced. The court began the sentencing hearing with a statement and a question. "I

2

On January 20, 2005, the State moved for summary reversal on the basis that
defendant was entitled to the benefit of a change in the law. On February 9, 2005, this
Court denied the motion. The State does not re-address the issue in this brief.
6

understand we have a third degree felony, driving under the influence

Any reason

sentence should not be pronounced at this time." ST2. Defense counsel stated, "No,
Your Honor." Id.
By that statement, defendant affirmatively represented that nothing more remained
to be done before the court sentenced defendant on the third degree felony DUI.
Defendant may well have done this because the trial court had informed him off-therecord that it was rejecting his argument that the State had the burden of proving that his
prior conviction was based on a voluntarily-entered guilty plea. Where "a party through
counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court
into error, [the appellate court] will then decline to save that party from the error." State
v. Bluff 2002 UT 66, \ 25, 52 P.3d 1210 (citing State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah
1989)). This Court should reject defendant's argument on this ground alone.
B.

Defendant was not "only found guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Rather, the
trial court clearly found him guilty of third degree felony DUI.
The record does not support defendant's claim that he was convicted of only a

class B misdemeanor. Indeed, defendant acknowledged below that his conviction was for
third degree felony DUI. As stated, the trial court's opening remarks at the sentencing
hearing were "I understand we have a third degree felony, driving under the
influence. .. . Any reason sentence should not be passed at this time?" ST2. Defense
counsel responded, "No, Your Honor." Id. When asked whether he had anything to say,
defense counsel observed, "This is a third DUI that did occur within the ten year statutory
period." Id. That statement was a clear allusion to third degree felony DUI. Thus, at
7

sentencing defendant understood and acknowledged that his conviction was for a third
degree felony.
Without acknowledging his concession below, defendant asserts for the first time
on appeal that "[t]he trial court found [him] guilty of a DUI, a class B misdemeanor." Br.
Appellant at 7. That assertion is not supported by the record, nor can it be inferred from
the record. Defendant asks this Court to infer that the trial court acquitted him because
the trial court's only announcement of its verdict was its statement, "I understand we
have a third degree felony." ST2. Defendant thereby asks for an unreasonable reading of
the record.
The court's findings at the bench trial refute defendant's claim that he was
convicted of only a class B misdemeanor. The trial court found every element of felony
DUI.
The version of the statute in effect at the time of the August 8, 2001 DUI offense
provided:
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person . . . is under the influence of alcohol,
any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree
that renders the person incapable of safely operating that vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) (2001). The enhancement provision of the statute
provided: "A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is
committed . . . within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section."
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (2001).

8

The evidence presented at trial required the trial court, sitting as trier-of-fact, to
make a credibility determination. The trial court credited Officer Randall's testimony
that defendant was "[e]xtremely intoxicated"—"intoxicated to the point that he couldn't
safely drive." TT19, 66. Based on this testimony, the court found defendant guilty of the
August 2001 DUI. Id at 66. Defendant has not challenged this finding.
The State also presented evidence of two prior convictions. One of the
convictions, entered March 12, 1993, followed a trial. TT63; see also R58. The other,
entered October 12, 1993, was based on a guilty plea. TT63; see also R56-57. The court
found that the State had met its burden to present evidence of two convictions within the
ten-year period preceding the August 2001 DUI offense. TT66.
As stated, however, defendant argued in closing argument that one of the prior
convictions, the conviction based on a guilty plea, could not be used to enhance the
August 2001 DUI. TT64. Defendant claimed that the State had the burden to show that
his 1993 guilty plea was "freely and voluntarily" entered and "that all of the
constitutional rights of the defendant were given to [him]" at the time he entered the plea.
TT69, 73. Defendant claimed that the State had not met that burden. Id. at 64.
Responding to that argument, the trial court found that the State had not introduced any
evidence "as to the procedures that took place on the original trial court level at the
municipal court." TT66.
The court, however, was not convinced that the State actually had the burden to
introduce such evidence. The court stated that the argument was "new to me." TT 69.
The court told defense counsel, "Now, what I'll do, Mr. Skabelund, if you want to pursue
9

that, I'll allow you to brief the issue

The purpose for that is to determine whether or

not it is a third degree felony or a lesser included offense of DUI [,] a class B
misdemeanor. I found [defendant] guilty of the class B misdemeanor. It's whether or not
he's guilty of the enhancement as well." TT67. The court further instructed, "I have
found [defendant] guilty of at least the lesser included offense of DUI. So the argument
is only as to whether or not it should be enhanced." TT67-68 (emphasis added).
The court then set sentencing for November 4, 2002. TT74. The court ordered
that defendant report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for preparation of a
presentence investigation report. Id. He ordered that AP&P "make recommendations as
if the defendant were convicted of a third degree felony." Id. The court stated that it
would consider the parties' pleadings on defendant's claim on November 4 prior to
sentencing. Id.
Defendant filed a brief in support of his claim regarding the State's burden. R8791. The State filed a response. R92-98. Defendant then filed a motion for continuance
of sentencing so that he could file a reply to the State's response. R100. The trial court
granted the motion. R104. The court set a hearing on the matter and sentencing for
November 26, 2004. Id. Defendant never filed a reply. Moreover, defendant did not
appear for sentencing. R105.
When defendant was apprehended on a bench warrant almost one year later, the
trial court again calendared the sentencing hearing. R109-110. Sentencing proceeded,
but defendant never again mentioned his claim that the State had an unmet burden to
show that the prior guilty plea was voluntary and that defendant was advised of his
10

constitutional rights when he entered it. See ST. Rather, defendant acceded to the trial
court's characterization of the matter to be decided, "I understand we have a third degree
felony, driving under the influence," and agreed that there was no "reason sentence
should not be passed." Id. at 2.
Defendant thus abandoned his claim. But even if he had not, he could not have
prevailed. Defendant claimed that the State had the burden to show that his prior
conviction was based on a "guilty plea that was made freely and voluntarily" and that "all
of [his] constitutional rights . . . were given to [him]" when he entered the plea. TT 69,
73. Controlling precedent holds otherwise.
An attack on a prior conviction "is collateral by definition" when a defendant
seeks "'to deprive [it] of [its] normal force and effect in a proceeding that [has] an
independent purpose other than to overturn the prior judgments.5" State v. Gutierrez,
2003 UT App 95, \ 7 n.l, 68 P.3d 1035 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992)).
"On collateral attack, a plea entered with the benefit of counsel is 'presumed to have been
voluntary' absent evidence demonstrating lack of voluntariness." Id. at ^ 8 (quoting State
v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1987)). Consequently, both this Court and the
Utah Supreme Court have held that the burden is on the defendant in this situation to
show that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. See State v. Triptow, 770
P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (holding that prior conviction is entitled to presumption of
regularity and that defendant has burden to "produce some evidence" to show otherwise);
Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95 atffl[7, 11 (holding that "once the State has proven a prior
conviction, a presumption of regularity arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to
11

produce 'some evidence5 of involuntariness"—"a transcript, testimony regarding taking
of the plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative evidence").
Here, defendant adduced no evidence that his prior guilty plea was not knowing or
voluntary. Moreover, the record is clear that defendant had counsel when he entered his
guilty plea and that he was advised of his constitutional rights. See R56-57. The guilty
plea conviction therefore was presumed voluntary, and its use for enhancement purposes
was proper. Id. at '[fij 8, 13.
C.

Even if this Court should determine that the trial court erred, the remedy is
not reversal of his felony conviction and entry of a misdemeanor conviction.
Rather, the remedy is remand for entry of a formal verdict and judgment on
the felony charge.
Even if this Court were to determine that the trial court erred when it did not more

formally announce its verdict, defendant's remedy is not remand for imposition of a
misdemeanor sentence. Rather, his remedy is remand for formal announcement of a
guilty verdict on the third degree felony charge, for entry of a third degree felony
conviction, and for imposition of an appropriate sentence on that conviction. See People
v. Lucatuorto, 690 N.Y. S.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that "trial courts in
criminal cases have the general inherent authority to correct their own mistakes,"
including, in the context of a bench trial, "the failure of the court to announce its verdict")
(citation and internal quotation omitted).
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. Alternatively, this Court should
remand for formal announcement of a guilty verdict on the third degree felony, for entry
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of a third degree felony conviction, and for imposition of an appropriate sentence on that
conviction.
Respectfully submitted this _/f
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